














Department of Economics 
San Diego State University and IZA 
San Diego, CA 92182 
Phone: (619) 594-1663 




Department of Economics 
Western Michigan University and IZA 
Kalamazoo, MI 49008 
Phone: (269) 387-5541 







September 13, 2007 













JEL Codes: J2 and E32 
 
 
(*) We are grateful for comments received at the Society for Labor Economists meetings as well 
as the feedback from anonymous referees. 
 Moonlighting over the Business Cycle 
Abstract 
Using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we examine the 
cyclicality of moonlighting by gender.  We estimate a random effects Tobit model of 
moonlighting among working men and women and find that, while male moonlighting behavior 
does not fluctuate significantly with the business cycle, female moonlighting does.  The 
cyclicality of female moonlighting has, nonetheless, varied over the course of the past 35 years.  
Female moonlighting seemed to behave counter-cyclically during much of the 1980s and early 
1990s, confirming the popular media belief that moonlighting is more likely to occur during 
periods of economic distress.  Yet, this counter-cyclical behavior disappears during the 1993-99 
period to become pro-cyclical by the early twentieth century.  The recent pro-cyclicality of 
female moonlighting supports the idea that female workers respond to a need for “just-in-time” 




 I.  Introduction   
During economic downturns, employment levels fall, unemployment rates increase and 
real wages drop.  As such, real wages are considered somewhat pro-cyclical.  Yet, very little is 
known about the cyclicality of multiple-job holding.  From a graphical analysis of national time 
series moonlighting data during the 1960s and 1970s, Stinson (1987) finds evidence of large 
increases in moonlighting during expansionary periods.  Likewise, Partridge’s (2002) findings 
support the possibility of pro-cyclical multiple job holding.  Yet, the popular media and 
employment think tanks discuss moonlighting as a by-product of financial pressures.
1  
Furthermore, the idea that individuals may hold multiple jobs during an economic downturn in 
order to supplement family income is consistent with the so-called ‘added worker effect’ in the 
labor economics literature.       
Why should we care about the cyclicality of multiple job holding in the economy?  There 
are numerous reasons.  First, moonlighting has played, and can be expected to continue to play, a 
visible role in the U.S. workforce.  The moonlighting rate was 5.2 percent as of 1970, with 7.0 
percent of male workers and 2.2 percent of female workers holding multiple jobs.  This 
moonlighting rate remained practically unchanged over the course of the next 30 years.  Yet, its 
gender incidence did fluctuate.  In particular, the female moonlighting rate grew over the past 
several decades from the above listed 2.2 percent in 1970, to 3.8 percent in 1980 and to 5.9 
percent in 1991, and exceeded the male rate for the first time in 1995 (6.5 percent versus 6.3 
percent).  In May 2007, the moonlighting rate was still similar to the moonlighting rate in 1970 
(i.e. 5.3 percent), although now females are much more likely to moonlight than men, with rates 
of 4.9 percent versus 5.7 percent.
2  Considered over the course of an entire year (versus at a point 
                                                 
1 See for example, The State of Working America, 2002-2003. 
2 These data were compiled from the Current Population Survey (CPS) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
1 in time), an even larger percentage of workers hold second jobs.  In this regard, Paxson and 
Sicherman (1996) note that approximately 20 percent of male workers and 12.2 percent of 
female workers hold second jobs in any given year (see p. 357).
3   As these numbers make clear, 
moonlighting is a substantively important labor market phenomenon; however, it is much 
understudied.  In fact, our review of the literature to follow will show that only a handful of 
research papers have studied this phenomenon.  Thus, our primary motivation for writing the 
paper is to shed light on a poorly understood, yet numerically important, feature of the labor 
market.    
A second reason for examining the cyclicality of multiple job holding is the potential 
importance of moonlighting in facilitating labor supply adjustments during temporary economic 
downturns or upturns.
4  Through a description of moonlighters, our analysis will shed light on 
how workers respond to fluctuations in job opportunities across the business cycle.   Macro-
economists and labor micro-economists have long studied employment cyclicality in an attempt 
to improve the explanations of the changing composition of the labor force over business cycles, 
e.g. the added and discouraged worker effects.
5   
Thirdly, as one part of the broader picture of economic cyclicality, our study fits nicely 
into the ongoing debate concerning the cyclicality of real wages.
6  Considerable research effort 
has been devoted to understanding the nature of real wage fluctuations across business cycles, 
yet these studies are muddied by a glossing lack of distinction between workers’ average real 
wages across all jobs and their wages in the primary job alone.  Understanding the role that 
                                                 
3 These figures may be somewhat overstated as some job changers may be mistakenly categorized as moonlighters 
(see p. 359). 
4 Conway and Kimmel (1998) argue that, if labor supply elasticity estimates were adjusted to reflect this additional 
labor supply adjustment, labor supply elasticities would be increased, although the magnitude of this increase would 
be small.  In other words, labor supply is more elastic than current empirical estimates suggest. 
5 For an explanation of these two effects and recent evidence, see Mincer (1966) and Spletzer (1997), respectively. 
6 Examples of research on this topic include Devereux (2001), Hart (2006), and Keane et al (1988). 
2 moonlighting may play in employment cyclicality may inform the debate concerning the 
measurement of real wages when studying real wage cyclicality.  
A final and policy relevant motivation for this research refers to the structure of 
employment taxes affecting secondary jobs.  As explained by Anderson and Meyer (2003), 
unemployment insurance (UI) payroll taxes are highly regressive, in large part because benefits 
are structured in the same way.
7  However, due to the UI payroll tax’s low taxable wage base, 
moonlighters working few hours in the second job are still subject to the full UI tax despite likely 
lacking eligibility for benefits in the event of a layoff.  Considering the important role that 
multiple job holding can play in the economy by responding to firms’ “just-in-time” labor needs, 
a better understanding of the cyclical nature of moonlighting can help inform the debate on how 
to best structure the UI tax.
8    
Given the magnitude of moonlighting and the policy implications that its cyclicality may 
have for the functioning of the labor market, we examine the responsiveness of male and female 
multiple job holding to business cycles.  We first review the existing descriptive evidence 
regarding this question.  Subsequently, we describe our data and methodology, concluding with a 
discussion of our findings. 
II.    Background on the Cyclicality of Moonlighting 
There is often the presumption that moonlighting is counter-cyclical.  In this vein, the 
Employment Policy Institute (1999) asserted that: “The benefits of persistent low unemployment 
are reflected in many labor market indicators.  Multiple job holding, for instance, has fallen over 
the last year…”.  Nonetheless, from a theoretical standpoint, moonlighting rates can be pro-
                                                 
7 The authors find that workers in the lowest earnings decile assign 3 percent of their earnings to UI payroll taxes, 
whereas for their counterparts in the highest earnings decile, only 0.5 percent of their earnings go to paying for such 
taxes. 
8 On the topic of UI and moonlighting, see Vroman and Nightingale (1996). 
3 cyclical or counter-cyclical.  Focusing on economic downturns, from a demand side, 
moonlighting opportunities may be limited during a recession as the total number of jobs falls.  
On the other hand, from a supply side, workers may choose to moonlight in an effort to stabilize 
family income during an economic downturn when unemployment rates are higher and real 
wages lower.  
  Partridge (2002) examines moonlighting during the period 1994 and 1998 using state-
level data.  While his focus is on the nature of second job holding during a period of strong 
economic growth, his paper offers insight into the potential cyclical pattern of moonlighting.  If 
moonlighters face a relatively high likelihood of being laid off during periods of high 
unemployment, or if moonlighting rises during periods of rapid economic growth and labor 
shortages, then moonlighting might be pro-cyclical (pg. 426).   
  Conway and Kimmel (1998) propose a model that leads to a more rigorous prediction 
regarding the cyclicality of moonlighting.  According to their theoretical framework, hours on 
the primary job and hours on the secondary job (along with leisure hours) enter the utility 
function separately.  Their model explicitly allows for two distinct reasons for moonlighting: 
primary job constraints (e.g. underemployment) and job heterogeneity (i.e. the second job might 
provide non-wage remuneration or affect utility differentially from the primary job).  From their 
model, it follows that an increase in non-wage income leads to a decline in moonlighting.  As 
such, moonlighting might be counter-cyclical.  Via the estimation of a fixed effects logit model 
of the likelihood of holding multiple jobs, Heineck and Schwarze (2004) find support for this 
notion.
9   However, Conway and Kimmel (1998) estimate a positive second job labor supply 
                                                 
9 Heineck and Schwarze (2004) compare secondary job holding in Germany and the United Kingdom.  This cross-
country comparison allows them to draw some conclusions regarding the role that institutions might play in 
moonlighting outcomes.  They conclude that, while institutions matter, they are not a substantial factor in explaining 
moonlighting rates. 
4 elasticity for men, suggesting that moonlighting might move cyclically with the business cycle 
since wages have been found to be slightly pro-cyclical.
10     
  Renna’s (2006) cross-country comparative research on moonlighting and overtime work 
provides interesting insight into our question regarding the cyclicality of moonlighting.  Renna 
finds that the incidence of moonlighting increases in the face of increased primary job constraints 
imposed by declining standard hours of work.  In other words, as workers have found it more 
difficult to accommodate desires for extra work hours on their primary jobs, they are more likely 
to take second jobs.  This implies that for workers seeking to increase their total work hours, 
moonlighting could serve as an alternative to overtime work.  Thus, his finding that overtime 
work is pro-cyclical suggests that moonlighting may also be pro-cyclical as both employment 
options are responses to the similar desire for increased work hours. 
  Two other possible motivations for moonlighting may be individuals’ responses to 
negative financial shocks and to primary job insecurity.  Boheim and Taylor (2004) examine 
these moonlighting reasons, both closely related to business cycle fluctuations, and find mixed 
evidence of multiple job holding in response to financial shocks and weak support for the job 
insecurity motivation.   
Yet, other studies in the literature refer to expectations about future income as another 
motive for moonlighting.  In this vein, Bell, Hartwright and Hart (1997a, 1997b) investigate the 
possibility that workers might take second jobs as a hedge against future unemployment.  That is, 
as expectations regarding a future economic downturn rise, moonlighting rates might increase.  
                                                 
10 Renna and Oaxaca (2006) focus on moonlighting workers who report no primary job hours constraints and whose 
multiple-job holding choice reflects a “personal preference for job differentiation” (pg. 1).  Their job portfolio model 
confirms Conway and Kimmel (1998) finding of a stronger wage elasticity of labor supply on the second job. 
5 However, their study, which uses British data from 1991 to 1998, fails to yield support for this 
hypothesis.
11
    In sum, there are sufficient reasons and evidence to suggest that moonlighting rates may 
respond in some systematic fashion to cyclical labor market fluctuations, but no clear indication 
of whether multiple job holding is pro- or counter-cyclical.  As such, we also lack a definite 
prediction regarding gender differences in moonlighting cyclicality.  Given that men and women 
exhibit different labor market trajectories and different degrees of employment cyclicality, their 
moonlighting choices and cyclicality may vary.
12  Indeed, historically, women were more likely 
to moonlight for financial reasons (e.g. Kimmel and Powell 1999), due to primary job constraints 
(Averett 2001), or to meet family responsibilities (Allen 1998) than men.  These gender 
differences in moonlighting may have diminished over time as female moonlighting rates have 
come to mirror those of men (and exceed male rates in recent years).  Yet, moonlighting women 
are still much more likely to work in a full-time primary job and a part-time secondary job, while 
moonlighting men are more likely to hold two full-time jobs.        
Why should we expect the cyclicality of moonlighting to differ between men and 
women?  One could cite various reasons.  First, gender differences in moonlighting cyclicality 
could be due to differences in the demographics of male and female moonlighters.  For instance, 
male moonlighters are more likely to be married or have children, while the opposite is true for 
women.  Secondly, gender differences in moonlighting cyclicality could stem from occupational 
segregation by sex and/or from industry seasonality.  In this vein, Goodman (2001) examines the 
                                                 
11 British moonlighting differs from U.S. moonlighting in three important ways: Brits have a higher moonlighting 
rate, display greater moonlighting persistence over time and their average secondary job wages are much higher than 
their average primary job wages. 
12 Hotchkiss and Robertson (2006) show that female labor force participation exhibits a much stronger pro-
cyclicality than that of males, which they explain is due to the females’ higher reservation wage.  In fact, controlling 
for education, men are half as responsive to labor market conditions so that, even if they become unemployed during 
an economic downturn, they are half as likely to leave the labor force. 
6 cyclicality of service jobs and notes that service jobs do not suffer much during recessions 
(although their growth does wane).  To the extent that women are more likely to work in the 
service sector, they may exhibit less cyclicality in their moonlighting behavior than men.   
However, Hotchkiss and Robertson (2006) show that lesser educated workers, many of whom 
are employed in the service industry, are more responsive to business cycle fluctuations.  Finally, 
Stinson (1990) shows that men moonlight for long periods of time and women are more likely to 
moonlight on a temporary basis to meet financial needs.  This feature may have some 
implications for gender differences in moonlighting cyclicality as well.   
  Much of the above-described gender differences in moonlighting, because they are 
explained by observable demographic differences, will be eliminated when standard regression 
procedures are implemented.  Thus, the question arises:  Once observable factors are controlled 
in a regression framework, would we expect any remaining gender differences in moonlighting?  
First, to the extent that we cannot measure precisely an individual’s reservation wage, we might 
expect such gender differences to persist.  But, what if regression methodologies are utilized that 
adjust, in some sense, for unobservable differences across individuals?  Then, we might expect 
some portion of expected gender differences in moonlighting patterns to disappear. 
III.  Data and Descriptive Statistics   
We use data drawn from the Geo-coded 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
File (NLSY79 Geo-coded file).
13  This is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 civilian 
young men and women aged 14-21 as of December 31, 1978.  This cohort was initially 
interviewed annually from 1979 through 1994.  Starting in 1994, the interviews were conducted 
biennially through the year 2002.   
                                                 
13 The NLSY-GeoCoded file data as well as documentation are available at:  
http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsgeo97.htm .  The geo-coded file was obtained under contract agreement #03-77. 
7 We have chosen the NLSY79 survey because its questionnaire is best suited for 
analyzing our research question.
14  Specifically, the survey instrument permits individuals to 
report up to 6 distinct jobs held within each calendar year, and includes job details, such as job 
start and end dates.  This permits us to construct precise measures of multiple job holding.  Other 
data sets, such as the PSID, may result in an over-statement of moonlighting, as it is difficult to 
distinguish multiple job holders from job changers.  The one drawback with the NLSY79 is that 
the data are representative of a specific age cohort.  However, focusing on this prime-aged sub-
sample allows us to derive useful information regarding moonlighting cyclicality and partially 
alleviates heterogeneity concerns. 
We work with separate unbalanced panels of men and women from the 20 rounds of the 
NLSY79.
15  In 2002, a total of 8,033 civilian and military respondents were interviewed.  We 
restrict our sample to person-year observations for which information is available regarding 
employment, earnings, race, gender, age, education, marital status, fertility, work limitations due 
to health related reasons and other location-specific variables.  We use the week-by-week 
longitudinal work records on each respondent from January 1978 to the year 2002 to construct 
variables indicative of the respondent’s sector of employment, occupation, tenure, weekly hours 
worked, and hourly rate of pay at the primary job.
16  Similarly, we create a dummy variable 
indicative of whether the respondent moonlighted, which we define as holding more than one job 
simultaneously for longer than one week.
17  
                                                 
14 Park and Shin (2005) and Tremblay (1990) use these data to examine the cyclicality of the real wages by gender. 
15 Robust standard errors are computed to correct for the heteroscedasticity that may affect our estimates.   
16 We deflate hourly wages using the CPI for all urban consumers, not seasonally adjusted, with base period 1982-
1984 was retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm
17 In this manner, we avoid counting as moonlighting job transitions during which the old and new jobs overlap 
briefly. 
8 Preliminary employment and moonlighting rates for men and women over the last two 
decades are shown in Table 1.  We compare employment and moonlighting rates for three time 
periods centered around 1980, 1990, and 2000.
18  In part due to the aging nature of the NLSY79 
cohort, employment and moonlighting rates increased between the 1980 and the 1990 time 
period, and then declined between the two time periods centered around 1990 and the year 2000.  
In particular, while moonlighting rates averaged 7 percent for both men and women over the 
period under consideration, moonlighting rates showed some fluctuations, peaking around 1990 
for both men and women.  Note that this now prime-aged sample exhibits a moonlighting rate 
somewhat above the national average of 5.3 percent for all workers. 
Tables 2A and 2B inform on some of the personal characteristics of single and multiple 
job holders for the same periods displayed in Table 1.  An increasingly larger fraction of multiple 
job holders are Black, with the percentage of moonlighters in our NLSY79 sample who are 
Black rising from 14 percent in the time period centered around 1980 to 32 percent around 2000.  
Additionally, moonlighters appear to be more highly educated than non-moonlighters, although 
the education gap narrows over time.  Looking at family characteristics, married men and women 
are less likely to hold more than one job, although the difference is quite small, and male single 
job holders seem to have more children than their moonlighting counterparts in earlier decades.  
Finally, a higher fraction of moonlighters reside in urban areas relative to single job holders. 
IV. Methodology 
  Our purpose is to examine the cyclicality of male and female moonlighting during the 
1980s and 1990s, up to the year 2002.  Underlying our empirical analyses is a standard 
                                                 
18 We use five-year averages.  For the year 1980, we use data from 1979 to 1983 (the survey started in 1979, hence 
data for 1978 were unavailable).  For 1990, we average data from 1988 to 1992 and, for the year 2000, averages 
from the 1998-2002 period are computed.  In this last period, we include three years instead of five because the 
NLSY79 survey switched from an annual to a biennial survey around that date. 
9 individual utility-maximizing model,
19 according to which working men and women decide 
whether to moonlight and, if so, the number of hours they will work in more than one job.  Note, 
however, that a non-negligible number of working men and women do not moonlight.   
Therefore, the distribution that applies to the sample data is a mixture of discrete and continuous 
distributions, rendering the use of OLS inappropriate.  Consequently, a Tobit model would seem 
more appropriate as it would take into account the censored nature of the distribution of working 
men and women’s moonlighting hours by modeling the likelihood of moonlighting and the hours 
moonlighted as a function of the same covariates.   
  A potential disadvantage of the Tobit model is that a change in any regressor will have 
the same overall effect (that is the same sign) on both the probability of moonlighting and on the 
number of hours moonlighted.  Hence, a two-part model could improve on the estimation by 
allowing for the possibility that variables affecting the decision to moonlight may impact the 
hours moonlighted differently.  Nonetheless, recognizing: i) the difficulty of conceiving 
appropriate identifiers that affect the decision to moonlight without influencing the hours 
moonlighted, and ii) the sensitivity of the findings to the choice of identifiers inherent in the 
estimation of two-part selection models, we view the estimation via a Tobit model as 
preferable.
20   
As such, we estimate the following random effects Tobit model.
21  The random effects 
specification allows us to adjust standard errors for the group-wise heteroskedasticity arising 
from the fact that the growth rate of non-farm employment only varies across states, while the 
                                                 
19 Conway and Kimmel (1998) provide a detailed derivation of this theoretical framework.   
20 A second potential disadvantage of the Tobit and two-part selection models is their reliance on normality and 
homoscedasticity in the latent variables.  However, as noted by Wooldridge (2008), neither conditional normality 
nor heteroskedasticity affect the unbiasedness or consistency of the OLS estimates and, as a result, for reasonable 
deviations from these assumptions, the Tobit model still provides good estimates.  
21 It should be noted that a fixed-effects Tobit model is not estimated as we lack a sufficient statistic to condition the 
fixed effects out of the likelihood function.   
10 remaining variables in our model vary across individuals (Moulton 1986), while also taking into 
account some of the individual heterogeneity shaping male and female moonlighting rates.   
Thus, we model the likelihood and the number of hours moonlighted by men and women as 
follows: 
(1)   where:  it it i it X y ε β α + + =
' * ( )
* max 0, it it yy =  and  ( )
2 , 0 ~ , | e i it it N X σ α ε .   
The vector  controls for a variety of personal, family, regional, time-related factors 
and specific primary job characteristics known to affect male and female employment patterns.  
In particular, among the personal and family characteristics, we include two dummies for race 
(Black, Other Race), a continuous measure of age, the highest grade completed by the 
respondent, a dummy variable for marital status (Married), and two measures of parental status 
(a dummy variable for the presence of young children in the household plus a continuous count 
of the total number of children in the household).  One might expect that individuals with greater 
demands on their non-market time (i.e., higher reservations wages) might, in addition to the 
standard conclusion of being less likely to seek paid employment), also be less likely to 
moonlight.  As we described earlier, we expect that these demographic controls will eliminate 
some of the observed gender differences in moonlighting. 
it X
We also include a variety of primary job characteristics possibly affecting the 
moonlighting decision and the hours moonlighted, such as the real primary job hourly wage, 
tenure, occupation and whether the job is in the private or public sector.  Likewise, we 
incorporate a number of regional and time-related factors in our regression analysis.  For 
instance, to control the fact that wealthier states might exhibit systematically different 
moonlighting patterns than less wealthy states, we include the state’s per capita income.   
Additionally, we include a dummy variable for residence in an urban area, and three regional 
11 dummies to address other macroeconomic differences in job markets.  Regarding time, we 
include a continuous time trend measure plus three time period dummies for the periods of time: 
1979-1985, 1986-1992, and 1993-1999, with the period 2000-2004 as the excluded period.
22  We 
structure our four time periods in this way so as to reflect distinct economic circumstances.  The 
first and second periods wrap around a recession and, thus, include the build-up to the recession, 
the recession itself, and the recovery.  The third period is unique as it reflects a 7 year period of 
substantial economic growth.  Finally, the fourth period is the shortest of the four and captures a 
slight economic downturn following the rapid economic growth of the mid to late 1990s.  We 
would expect period differences in moonlighting; therefore, structuring our periods in this way 
will maximize our efforts to reveal these differences.  
 Finally, our business cycle measure is the state’s growth rate in non-farm employment.  
The bulk of the literature examining the cyclicality of real wages relies on national 
unemployment rate measures, insufficient for our needs due to the existence of regional 
disparities in industrial composition and moonlighting rates (see, for example, Partridge 2002).  
Additionally, state unemployment rates may be subject to greater measurement error due to the 
smaller sample sizes from which the data are drawn.  Finally, reliance on a static measure of 
economic activity at the state level may be problematic because states vary in their equilibrium 
unemployment rates (Blanchard and Katz, 1992).  Thus, we rely on the more accurately 
measured non-farm employment and construct its growth rate.  Additionally, to better capture 
potential differences in moonlighting cyclicality over the time period under examination, we 
interact the time period dummies with the growth rate in non-farm employment.   
 
                                                 
22 We opted not to include year dummies because, to the extent that our data come from a single cohort of 
individuals, the population is not likely to have a different distribution over time and, as such, the year dummies 
would likely be picking up much of the cyclical variation that is the focus of our research.     
12 V.  Moonlighting over the Business Cycle 
Results from our random effects Tobit models are displayed in Tables 3A and 3B.  Male 
and female Blacks moonlight more than whites.  Married men, men with greater family 
responsibilities, and men and women residing in states with higher per capita incomes moonlight 
less than single men, men with fewer children, or men and women residing in poorer states, 
respectively.  In contrast, more educated men and women seem more likely to moonlight, 
perhaps due in part to their access to part-time consulting opportunities.   
Primary job characteristics play an important role in the decision to moonlight, 
particularly among women.  For instance, both men and women appear more likely to hold a 
second job, the longer their tenures in their primary jobs.  Perhaps workers with longer job 
tenures are more reluctant to change jobs entirely when new opportunities arise, resulting in 
higher multiple-job holding.  Additionally, men and women working in higher skilled 
occupations seem less likely to moonlight than their counterparts in service related jobs (the 
category of reference).  It is also worth noting that, while male moonlighting does not seem to be 
shaped by primary job wages, female moonlighting is responsive to wage changes.  A $10 
increase in women’s primary job wages would reduce their moonlighting likelihood by 1 
percentage point and hours moonlighted by approximately 0.2 hours. This is consistent with the 
finding of Kimmel and Connelly (1998).  In addition to wages, women working in the public 
sector are about 6 percentage points more likely to moonlight and, once they moonlight, work 2 
more hours in their secondary jobs than their counterparts in the private sector.   
Of particular interest are the differences in moonlighting over the various periods of time.  
Male and female moonlighting was more prominent during each of three time periods spanning 
between 1979 and 1999 relative to the 2000-02 period used as reference.  Specifically, during the 
13 1979-85 period, men and women were about 12 and 21 percentage points more likely to 
moonlight, respectively.
23  If they held multiple jobs, moonlighting men and women worked an 
average of 4 and 8 more hours per week than their counterparts during the more recent reference 
period of 2000-02.  These estimates dropped between 1986-92 to 10 percentage points and 3 
hours among men, and to 15 percentage points and 5 hours among women.  Finally, between 
1993 and 1999, men and women were only 7 and 6 percentage points more likely to moonlight 
than their counterparts in 2000-02.  Additionally, their hours moonlighted dropped to just 2 more 
hours per week.   
What can we say about the cyclicality of moonlighting?  Period-specific moonlighting 
cyclicality results for men and women are presented in Table 4.  There is no evidence of any 
moonlighting cyclicality for men.  However, female moonlighting is counter-cyclical during the 
1980s and early 1990s, then turns pro-cyclical by the beginning of the twentieth century.   
Specifically, a two percent increase in the growth rate of non-farm employment (the average in 
our sample is close to 2 percent – see Appendix Table A) would lower the probability of 
moonlighting among women by approximately 0.8 percentage points in 1979-85 and by 1.4 
percentage points during 1986-92.  However, the same increase in the growth rate of non-farm 
employment would increase the likelihood of moonlighting and the weekly hours moonlighted 
by women by approximately 3 percentage points and 58 minutes, respectively, during the 
reference time period of 2000-02.  These results help explain the apparently contradictory views 
of moonlighting as a byproduct of economic distress stressed by advocacy groups with the view 
of moonlighting as the response of “just-in-time” labor to an increasing labor demand following 
periods of economic growth.   
                                                 
23 These estimates (as well as the ones corresponding to the number of hours moonlighted) are computed adding up 
the marginal effects corresponding to the time period dummy and its interaction term evaluated at the mean growth 
rate of non-farm employment in Table A. 
14 VI.    Summary and Conclusions 
  We examine male and female moonlighting cyclicality over the 1980s, 1990s and early 
twentieth century.  We find that, despite diminishing over time, both men and women were more 
likely to moonlight and moonlighted longer hours during the 1980s and 1990s than during the 
2000-2002 period.  Additionally, while male moonlighting does not seem to respond to business 
cycles, female moonlighting does.  Specifically, consistent with the popular media, female 
moonlighting appeared counter-cyclical during the 1980s and early 1990s.  These are time 
periods that wrapped up around a recession and, as such, our finding suggests that moonlighting 
during those times may have been a byproduct of economic distress.  This finding is also 
consistent with the lower incidence of moonlighting in higher per capita income states.  Yet, this 
counter-cyclical behavior disappears during the 1993-99 period –a period of rapid economic 
growth– to become pro-cyclical by the early twentieth century.  The recent pro-cyclicality of 
female moonlighting, which follows the economics growth of the 1993-99 period, supports the 
idea that female workers respond to a need for “just-in-time” employment characteristic of 
economic upturns.  While the analyses differ in their focus and usage of state level data, the 
recent pro-cyclicality of female moonlighting supports the findings by Partridge (2002) and 
Renna (2006).  Partridge (2002) argues that short-run moonlighting appears to be pro-cyclical 
and states that “moonlighting appears to be a regional labor market shock absorber” (see p. 438).  
Similarly, Renna (2006) finds that, like overtime work, moonlighting is pro-cyclical and is used 
by workers as a means to increase their work hours.     
  Overall, the analysis provides us with a better understanding of the variability and 
business cyclicality of male and female moonlighting over the past decades, which can prove 
useful in anticipating the adjustment of men and women to fluctuations in job opportunities over 
15 the business cycle.  Additionally, our findings are relevant for the literature on real wage 
cyclicality.  To the extent that the incidence of moonlighting is pro-cyclical during recent years 
and primary job wages exceed secondary job wages,
24 average hourly real wages across all jobs 
should be more pro-cyclical than primary job wages due to the incidence of secondary jobs.  
Further research examining real wage cyclicality separately by gender across all jobs held 
concurrently may help assess the role of moonlighting cyclicality in explaining overall real wage 
cyclicality.  Finally, a better understanding of the cyclicality of male and female moonlighting 
can prove useful in informing the debate on how to structure UI taxes.   
  
                                                 
24 Kimmel and Conway (2001) compare primary and secondary job wages across age and education categories, 
primary and secondary job occupations, as well as family income status, and consistently find that on average, 
primary job wages exceed secondary job wages.  Relevant to this question is the recent work by Hart (2006), who 
examines the real wage cyclicality of full versus part time workers. 
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18 Table 1 
Working and Moonlighting Rates by Gender 
 
1980 1990 2000 
Variables 
Working Moonlighting Working Moonlighting Working Moonlighting 
Men  0.72 0.05 0.81 0.08 0.82 0.07 
Women  0.79 0.05 0.91 0.09 0.91 0.07 







Male Single versus Dual Job Holders 
(Only Includes Workers) 
 
1980 1990 2000 
Variables 
One Job  Moonlighting  One Job  Moonlighting One  Job Moonlighting 
Percent  White  0.73 0.81 0.69 0.71 0.63 0.64 
Percent  Black  0.21 0.15 0.24 0.25 0.30 0.30 
Highest  Grade  Completed  11.86 12.82 13.02 13.64 13.31 13.73 
Married  0.21 0.14 0.56 0.46 0.58 0.54 
#  Children  0.24 0.09 1.22 0.99 1.55 1.67 
Urban  0.79 0.82 0.79 0.81 0.76 0.77 







Female Single versus Dual Job Holders 
(Only Includes Workers) 
 
1980 1990 2000 
Variables 
One Job  Moonlighting  One Job  Moonlighting One  Job Moonlighting 
Percent  White  0.71 0.81 0.69 0.70 0.67 0.64 
Percent  Black  0.24 0.14 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.32 
Highest  Grade  Completed  11.49 12.05 12.66 13.12 13.07 13.27 
Married  0.12 0.11 0.50 0.49 0.61 0.57 
#  Children  0.10 0.10 0.79 0.85 1.27 1.18 
Urban  0.78 0.82 0.79 0.80 0.74 0.76 
Notes: Authors’ tabulations using the NLSY79. 
 
19 Table 3A 
Random Effects Tobit Model of Male Moonlighting   
 
Variables  Coefficient  S.E.  M.E. on Prob (Y>0)  M.E. on E(Y|Y>0) 
        
Personal and Family Characteristics        
Black 2.355***  0.927  0.030  0.867 
Other Race  1.828  1.776 0.023 0.675 
Age 0.083  0.154  0.001  0.030 
Highest Grade  1.307***  0.177  0.017  0.475 
Married -3.012***  0.784  -0.038  -1.088 
Young Children  -4.602***  0.973  -0.058  -1.635 
No. of Children  0.753*  0.428  0.010  0.274 
Health Limitations  0.264  1.511  0.003  0.096 
Past Non-labor Income  -3.05E-06  8.57E-06  -3.88E-08  -1.11E-06 
Primary Job Characteristics 
Real Hourly Wage  -0.005  0.025  -6.00E-05  -0.002 
Public Sector Job  1.107  0.929  0.014  0.405 
Professional, Technical, Clerical  -2.132***  0.787  -0.027  -0.777 
Craftsmen, Operatives, Laborers  -1.838  1.200  -0.023  -0.659 
Tenure 0.278***  0.012  0.004  0.101 
Tenure Squared  -5.21E-05***  2.46E-06  -6.60E-07  -1.89E-05 
Regional and Time Related Factors 
Urban 1.179  0.940  0.015  0.429 
Northeast -29.059*  15.682  -0.342  -8.949 
South -12.886  11.897  -0.162  -4.556 
West   12.973  17.457  0.162  5.095 
Time Period 1979-85  10.968***  3.788  0.138  4.142 
Time Period 1986-92  8.720***  2.506  0.110  3.232 
Time Period 1993-99  8.520***  2.528  0.107  3.264 
Growth Non-farm Employment  0.476  0.699  0.006  0.173 
Period 79-85*Growth NFE  -0.780  0.740  -0.010  -0.284 
Period 86-92*Growth NFE  -0.366  0.757  -0.005  -0.133 
Period 93-99*Growth NFE  -1.584  0.981  -0.020  -0.576 
State PC Income  -0.001***  3.02E-04  -1.34E-05  -3.85E-04 
Regression Fit Statistics Observations  11391 
 Groups  3907 
  Wald Chi2 (78)  944.22 
 Log  Likelihood  -32470.957 
Notes: All regressions include a constant term, state dummies and a time trend.  Sales and services are used as 
reference categories for the primary job occupation.  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1% level, 







20 Table 3B 
Random Effects Tobit Model of Female Moonlighting   
 
Variables  Coefficient  S.E.  M.E. on Prob (Y>0)  M.E. on E(Y|Y>0) 
        
Personal and Family Characteristics        
Black 3.419***  1.043  0.035  1.167 
Other Race  -1.518  1.875 -0.015  -0.505 
Age -0.040  0.177  -4.10E-04  -0.013 
Highest Grade  1.123***  0.192  0.011  0.378 
Married -0.777  1.018  -0.008  -0.261 
Young Children  -0.470  1.236  -0.005  -0.158 
No. of Children  0.495  0.540  0.005  0.166 
Health Limitations  0.125  2.150  0.001  0.042 
Past Non-labor Income  5.22E-06  1.04E-05  5.33E-08  1.76E-06 
Primary Job Characteristics 
Real Hourly Wage  -0.054**  0.027  -0.001  -0.018 
Public Sector Job  5.809***  1.159  0.060  2.022 
Professional, Technical, Clerical  -2.707***  1.072  -0.028  -0.903 
Craftsmen, Operatives, Laborers  -6.116***  0.992  -0.062  -2.050 
Tenure 0.325***  0.013  0.003  0.109 
Tenure Squared  -6.01E-05***  2.48E-06  -6.14E-07  -2.02E-05 
Regional and Time Related Factors 
Urban -0.495  1.041  -0.005  -0.166 
Northeast -14.457  14.246  -0.144  -4.529 
South 12.848  14.969  0.131  4.446 
West   15.476  20.581  0.158  5.592 
Time Period 1979-85  25.013***  4.388  0.253  9.027 
Time Period 1986-92  19.311***  2.950  0.196  6.733 
Time Period 1993-99  9.738***  2.944  0.100  3.440 
Growth Non-farm Employment  1.435*  0.820  0.015  0.483 
Period 79-85*Growth NFE  -2.090**  0.865  -0.021  -0.703 
Period 86-92*Growth NFE  -2.184***  0.884  -0.022  -0.734 
Period 93-99*Growth NFE  -1.820*  1.101  -0.019  -0.612 
State PC Income  -0.002***  3.50E-04  -1.85E-05  -0.001 
Regression Fit Statistics Observations  137448 
 Groups  4424 
  Wald Chi2 (78)  1114.97 
 Log  Likelihood  -36825.782 
Notes: All regressions include a constant term, state dummies and a time trend.  Sales and services are used as 
reference categories for the primary job occupation.  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1% level, 
**at the 5% level and *at the 10% level.   
21 Table 4: Tobit Estimates of Moonlighting Cyclicality among Working Men and Women 
 
Men Women  Group Computation  Probability Hours(min.) Probability  Hours(min.) 
Cyclicality in 1979-85  85 1979 * − + period grnfe grnfe me me   -0.004  -0.111 (-7 m.)  -0.004**  -0.22 (13 m.) 
Cyclicality in 1986-92  92 1986 * − + period grnfe grnfe me me   0.001  0.04 (2 m.)  -0.007**  -0.251 (15 m.) 
Cyclicality in 1993-99  99 1993 * − + period grnfe grnfe me me   -0.14  -0.403 (-24 m.)  -0.006  -0.129 (8 m.) 
Cyclicality in 2000-02  grnfe me   0.006  0.173 (10 m.)  0.015*  0.0483* (29 m.) 
Notes:  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1% level, **signifies statistically different from zero at the 5% level and 
*signifies statistically different from zero at the 10% level.  For the first three time periods in the table, the significance levels 
correspond to those from a joint significance Chi-square (2) test.    
 
22 Appendix  
Table A: Means and Standard Deviations 
 
Women   Men 
One Job  Moonlighting  One Job  Moonlighting  Variables 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
          
White  0.69 0.46 0.71 0.45 0.69 0.46 0.72 0.45 
Black  0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.44 0.23 0.42 
Other Race  0.05  0.22  0.05  0.21 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.20 
Age  27.49 6.58 28.42 6.46 27.35 6.54 28.63 6.73 
Highest  Grade  12.80 2.18 13.02 2.33 12.41 2.37 13.52 2.18 
Married 0.46  0.50  0.41  0.49 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49 
Separated 0.05  0.21  0.03  0.17 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.20 
Divorced 0.09  0.29  0.07  0.26 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.32 
Widowed 0.00  0.07  0.00  0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.08 
Never Married  0.40  0.49  0.48 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.45 0.50 
Young Children  0.32  0.47  0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.41 
No. of Children  0.94  1.12  0.67 1.07 0.63 1.04 0.84 1.14 
Health Limitations  0.05  0.22 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.22 
Previous Year Non-labor Income  17190.75 40122.81 13476.70 40006.20 13009.20 37993.54 16995.04 38280.87 
Urban  0.80 0.41 0.80 0.41 0.79 0.41 0.81 0.40 
Northeast 0.17  0.38  0.19  0.39 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40 
North Central  0.23  0.42  0.27 0.45 0.24 0.42 0.26 0.44 
South  0.40 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.38 0.48 0.36 0.48 
West   0.19  0.39  0.20  0.40 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.38 
Time Period 1979-85  0.38  0.48 0.30 0.46 0.38 0.49 0.31 0.46 
Time Period 1986-92  0.37  0.48 0.39 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.37 0.48 
Time Period 1993-99  0.18  0.38 0.22 0.41 0.18 0.38 0.22 0.41 
Time Period 2000-02  0.08  0.27 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.31 
State PC Income  17759.55  6326.97  18900.42 6209.25 17795.71 6300.73 18902.96 6395.50 
Growth Non-farm Employment  1.90 2.02 1.89 1.95 1.90 2.04 1.86 1.94 
Real Hourly Wage  5.98  10.88  7.92  13.72 11.57  280.72 6.82  13.94 
Public Sector Job  0.14  0.34 0.15 0.36 0.08 0.27 0.18 0.38 
Professional, Technical, Clerical  0.54 0.50 0.35 0.48 0.25 0.43 0.60 0.49 
Craftsmen, Operatives, Laborers  0.13 0.34 0.40 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.11 0.31 
Sales and Services  0.30  0.46 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.40 0.26 0.44 
Tenure  33.38 34.74 56.57 83.19 33.93 62.79 55.27 65.89 
Hours in Non-primary Job  -  -  30.49  25.32  -  -  25.67  22.08 
          
  
23 